bad-key-revoker: also deactivate accounts with blocked keys#8837
Open
aarongable wants to merge 1 commit into
Open
bad-key-revoker: also deactivate accounts with blocked keys#8837aarongable wants to merge 1 commit into
aarongable wants to merge 1 commit into
Conversation
Contributor
|
@aarongable, this PR adds one or more new feature flags: DeactivateBadKeyAccounts. As such, this PR must be accompanied by a review of the Let's Encrypt CP/CPS to ensure that our behavior both before and after this flag is flipped is compliant with that document. Please conduct such a review, then add your findings to the PR description in a paragraph beginning with "CPS Compliance Review:". |
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
1 participant
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
When bad-key-revoker is processing a new row from the blockedKeys table, also deactivate any accounts whose key matches the newly-blocked key. This ensures that a key compromise doesn't allow a bad actor to take over an ACME account.
Put the new behavior behind a feature flag, because it requires a database permission change that will have to be deployed separately. Also add a new helper function to core/util.go, to ensure that the way we calculate account key hashes never diverges from the way we compute certificate key hashes.
Fixes #5683
IN-12841 tracks the corresponding SRE-side database and config changes